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I. INTRODUCTION
We are well into President Obama's second year in office and long past
the deadline set out in his executive order directing the closure of the Guan-
tanamo Bay detention facility by January of 2010.' Meanwhile, the debate
continues to rage over where the masterminds of the 9/11 attacks should be
tried. Initial efforts to move the 9/11 co-conspirators to New York and try
them in federal district court have been rebuffed,2 and President Obama and
Attorney General Holder have been roundly criticized by some for their ini-
tial efforts to move these cases to federal court. These, and other cases that
originated under military commissions proceedings, remain in legal limbo
and the question of where to try these suspects has become a sort of "third
rail" that no politician wants to touch, lest they are accused of being soft on
terrorists.4
* Professor Victor Hansen is a Professor of Law at New England Law in Boston where
he teaches Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Evidence and National Security Law. The
author wishes to thank Elizabeth Funk for her invaluable research assistance.
1. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4898 (Jan. 22, 2009).
2. See generally Members of the Senate Hold a News Conference on Funding for the
Trials of the Alleged 9/11 Conspirators (Feb. 2, 2010) (transcript available at
http:/Agraham.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressRoom.PressReleases&ContentR
ecordid=9156B7E2-802A-23AD-4C29-A2B I3359E IB2).
3. Charlie Savage, U.S. to Try Avowed 9/11 Mastermind Before Civilian Court in New
York, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 14, 2009, at Al.
4. In December Congress passed legislation significantly restricting the ability of the
President to move people from Guantanamo by prohibiting funding of those efforts. Also, on
March 7th the President signed an Executive Order, which among other things, allows for the
resumption of military commissions at Guantanamo, expresses a desire to close Guantanamo,
establishes a system of periodic review of those detainees at Guantanamo who will not face
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Many in legal academia-including myself-have criticized this current
debate as being superficial and unprincipled. Nevertheless, it is clear that
those opposed to trying suspected terrorists in federal court have tapped into
a genuine and powerful force, and there is no question that this opposition
raises legitimate and important questions about national security and the role
the law should play in balancing the need for security against individual
rights and freedoms.
Up to this point, the question has been framed as: What is the best fo-
rum for trying these suspected terrorists? Perhaps it is time to re-frame the
question. Instead of asking what forum is best suited to try the 9/11 co-
conspirators and others currently detained at Guantanamo, maybe we should
be asking what legal accommodations must be made if we try these suspects
at all, and whether one choice offers an alternative that will be less corrosive
to our system of justice.
Later generations will look back at our legal responses to terrorism just
as we have looked at our own history-sometimes with pride and other times
with shame and regret. In times of trial, the legitimacy of our legal system is
upheld by close adherence to principles upon which that system is based. If
we only adhere to those principles in times of peace and abandon them in
times of trouble, or when difficulties arise, there is little justification for pre-
serving such a system. Reframing the debate to ask what compromises and
accommodations must be made to our system of justice in order to bring ac-
cused terrorists to justice might allow us to get closer to this fundamental
question.
Refraining the debate in this way also allows us to better see the mo-
tives behind many government programs such as extraordinary renditions,
enhanced interrogation techniques, and the formation of military commis-
sions. Once we see these motives more clearly, we can better determine their
legitimacy.
By reframing the question to focus on the legal accommodations needed
to bring these suspects to justice, I believe two inescapable conclusions fol-
low. First, our decision to use extraordinary renditions, "black sites," and
military commission of federal trial but will still be detained, and preserves the fight to try
certain individuals in federal court. See Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,277 (Mar. 7,
2011). Neither this legislation nor the Executive Order resolves this question of where to try
suspected terrorists like KSM. On April 4, 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder reversed an
earlier decision and announced that the so called "9/11 co-conspirators" would be tried by
military commission, not in federal court as had been previously announced. Attorney Gen-
eral Holder said that while he believed that trial in federal court was the better option, recent
congressional action had made that option virtually impossible. Statement of the Attorney
General on the Prosecution of the 9/11 Conspirators, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Apr. 4, 2011,
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/201 I/ag-speech-I !0404.html.
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enhanced interrogation techniques has had far reaching implications on our
system of justice, and has affected that system in very specific ways that
were likely unanticipated by the proponents of these programs.' Second,
with respect to the evidence obtained by coercion, the greatest corrosion to
our system of justice will occur if we opt to try these suspects by the current
formulation of the military commissions system, though ultimately the ad-
verse effects of these programs will be realized in any forum these terrorist
suspects are tried.
It is useful to go back and ask what the government hoped to achieve by
holding suspected terrorists like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in CIA "black
sites" located in third countries, subjecting them to water boarding and other
interrogation techniques that are certainly cruel, inhumane, and degrading,
even if not classified as torture.6 The concern here is not the legality or ille-
gality of these practices, but the "products" that the government hoped to
obtain by using these practices.
There were at least two primary products the government hoped would
come from these practices: First, to gain usable, actionable intelligence to
detect and disrupt terrorist networks and prevent future attacks against the
United States' interests;' and second, to use information obtained in subse-
quent prosecutions of specific terrorist suspects.8 I believe it is fair to as-
sume the reason the United States sought to achieve these objectives by
means of extraordinary rendition is because the government wanted to em-
ploy techniques of questionable legality, if not outright torture to obtain this
information.
There is clearly an inherent tension in seeking useful intelligence to
prevent future terrorist attacks and simultaneously collecting information for
subsequent prosecution. That tension is nothing new and compromises must
5. In military terminology, a "black site" is a location at which an unacknowledged
black project is conducted. Recently, the term has gained notoriety in describing secret pris-
ons operated by the United States (U.S.) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), generally outside
of U.S. territory and legal jurisdiction. It can refer to the facilities that are controlled by the
CIA used by the U.S. government in its War on Terror to detain alleged unlawful enemy com-
batants. U.S. President George W. Bush acknowledged the existence of secret prisons operat-
ed by the CIA during a speech on September 6, 2006. See Bush Admits to CIA Secret Prisons,
BBC NEWS, (Sept. 7, 2006,4:18 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5321606.stm.
6. Gregory S. McNeal, A Cup of Coffee After the Waterboard: Seemingly Voluntary
Post-Abuse Statements, 59 DEPAUL L. REv. 943, 947-48 (2010).
7. Dakota S. Rudesill, Foreign Public Opinion and National Security, J. OF NAT'L SEC.
F., in 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 5223, 5235 (2010).
8. See George W. Bush, President of the United States, President Bush's Statement
regarding Secret Detention Centers in the EU (Sept. 6, 2006) (transcript available at
http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/president-bushs-statementregarding-secret-detention-centers-
eu/p 15060).
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be made if information is going to be used for both purposes. Moreover,
there is an ongoing debate whether information obtained by torture or other
coercive interrogation techniques really provides useful intelligence. While
both of these issues are important, they are not the focus of this essay.
The primary concern here is with the use of coerced statements in any
subsequent criminal prosecution of suspected terrorists. I seek to examine
how schemes of rights infringements, such as extraordinary renditions and
coercive interrogations, translate into specific and corrosive questions of
accommodation. If accommodations are made now to bring these suspects to
justice, does choosing one system over another at least reduce, if not elimi-
nate the accommodations that must be made, so as to limit the corrosive im-
pact on our system of justice?
Currently, there are three proffered alternatives for prosecuting individ-
uals who were subject to extraordinary rendition and coercive interrogations.
The first alternative is trying them in federal district court. The second alter-
native is trying them via a court-martial proceeding under the Uniform Code
of Military Justice. The third option is to try them by military commission.
What are the consequences of embarking on a practice of extraordinary ren-
ditions, torture, and coercive interrogations when the government later wants
to prosecute those suspects? Specifically, how would each of these forums
address the admissibility of coerced statements?
II. TRIAL IN FEDERAL COURT
Prior to the creation of military commissions, trying terrorists in federal
court was the norm and despite the existence of military commissions, the
vast majority of terrorist cases are still being tried in federal district courts.9
Even so, the cases that have been tried in federal courts are different in na-
ture than the cases we are talking about. With the exception of Ghailani case
recently tried in a New York federal court,' ° the cases tried in federal courts
involved terrorist acts, attempts, or plots by suspects apprehended within the
United States." These cases did not involve issues of extraordinary rendi-
9. See CTR. ON LAW & SEc., N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE TERRORIST
TRIAL REPORT CARD 2001-2009: LESSONS LEARNED 5 (2009).
10. United States v. Ghailani, No. SI0 98 Crim. 1023 (LAK), 2010 WL 3956807, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2010). It is interesting to note that the judge in that case recently ruled
that evidence that was derived from unlawful interrogation techniques could not be admitted
at trial. See Benjamin Weiser, Judge Prohibits Key U.S. Witness in Terror Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 7, 2010, at At.
11. See generally United States v. Ressam, 593 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2010); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (amended 2009).
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tion, allegations of torture, or other coercive interrogations, and therefore the
more complicated questions involved in the possible trial of Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed and the other 9/11 co-conspirators have not yet been addressed
by the federal courts.
Nevertheless, trial in federal court provides the most familiar method
for prosecuting even these more complex cases. So, if we move forward
with a federal court trial, potential questions are: How are the federal courts
going to address the admissibility of coerced confessions? What accommo-
dations would have to be made in order for this evidence to be admitted and
considered? And what type of impact would that have on the more run-of-
the-mine cases?
Before addressing these questions, one fundamental issue needs to be
considered: To what extent, if any, do the constitutional protections against
coerced confessions even apply to cases where the alleged crimes, capture,
rendition, and interrogations took place outside of the United States? This is
not an easy question and while it is not the primary focus here, some though-
ts about it are important.1 2
There is much dispute over if and how constitutional protections that
are a routine part of domestic criminal prosecutions would apply to criminal
prosecutions of these suspected terrorists, whose connection to the United
States is tenuous at best.'3 While the Supreme Court of the United States has
not addressed this issue directly, past cases do provide some guidance. The
two most recent cases where the Court addressed the extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Constitution are United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez14 and Boume-
diene v. Bush.15 From these cases, we can glean principles that may provide
guidance in the trial of cases that involved extraordinary renditions and coer-
cive interrogations.
Verdigo-Urquidez dealt with the warrantless search of the defendant's
home in Mexico by DEA agents and Mexican law enforcement officials.
16
12. These issues are relevant to some degree regardless of the forum used to try these
suspects. If certain constitutional protections are available to terrorist suspects in federal
court, there is the possibility that these protections should also apply to military commissions.
Even though the Court in In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), limited its review in that case to
questions of jurisdiction of the military commission appointed to try General Yamashita, that
Court noted that while it does not make the laws of war, it respects them "so far as they do not
conflict with the commands of Congress or the Constitution." In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 7-
8, 16.
13. See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
14. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
15. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
16. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 263.
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Although the defendant was a Mexican citizen, the Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement applied to
this search outside of the U.S. border. 17 Applying a social contract theory, a
plurality reasoned that since the defendant was not a citizen or legal alien,
and because he had no significant contacts with the United States, the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to this search. 8
Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote upholding the search, but took a
different approach to the extraterritorial application of the Fourth Amend-
ment.19 Adopting the Court's earlier test in what has become known as the
Insular Cases, ° Justice Kennedy asked whether the application of the Fourth
Amendment in this situation was "impracticable and anomalous. 21 Justice
Kennedy reasoned it was and determined the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirements did not apply.22 Justice Kennedy did seem to suggest, however,
that other constitutional protections that relate to fundamental due process
might apply.2
3
Later, in Boumediene, Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, holding
the constitutional right to habeas corpus applied to the detainees being held
on a military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.24 As in his concurrence in
Verdugo-Urquidez, Justice Kennedy took a practical approach to the extra-
territorial application of the Constitution. 5 In Boumediene, Justice Kennedy
listed three primary factors relevant to determining the extraterritorial appli-
cation of the right to habeas corpus. 26 These factors are: "(1) the [detai-
nees'] citizenship and status . . . and the adequacy of the process through
which that status [was determined]; (2) the nature of the sites where appre-
hension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inhe-
rent in resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the writ., 27 These factors reject
formalism and instead take a pragmatic view of the Constitution's extraterri-
torial application.
17. Id. at 261.
18. ld. at 274-75.
19. Id. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
20. The Insular Cases, as they are referred to, are the following cases: Balzac v. Porto
Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi,
190 U.S. 197 (1903); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
21. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 730, 771 (2008).
25. Id. at 766-7 1.
26. Id. at 766.
27. Id.
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While this approach is driven by context and lacks the clarity of bright
line rules, it does provide some guidance for questions of whether, and to
what extent, due process requirements would apply to confessions obtained
overseas by government agents using coercive interrogation techniques. In
light of these cases, it seems likely that fundamental due process protections
against the admissibility of coerced confessions will apply, even though the
confessions were obtained outside of the United States. This is particularly
true, since these trials would most likely be conducted in the United States.
It is much less certain whether the Court-created Miranda rights warnings
would be required. This is so for a number of reasons, not the least of which
is that the Court has never held that Miranda warnings are an independent
constitutional requirement.
28
One concern of those opposed to trying these suspects in federal court is
a "watered down" constitutional effect.29 If these constitutional protections
are applied to the confessions and any derivative evidence obtained from
these confessions, the evidence will either be suppressed completely, or the
courts will have to "water down" certain constitutional protections. The ef-
fect will be a risk to the rights of ordinary non-terrorist citizens.
Assuming that, at a minimum, due process prohibitions against coerced
confessions would apply to statements obtained while these suspects were
being held at overseas locations, what might these cases look like? We can
assume from public statements about the interrogation methods used that
some of these suspects were subjected to water boarding, sleep deprivation,
slapping, shoving, and long periods of isolation and uninterrupted interroga-
tions.30 So what are the courts likely to say about the confessions and deriva-
tive evidence that were the products of these interrogations?
Nearly eighty years ago, the Supreme Court in Brown v. Mississippi
3
'
invalidated the confessions of three black defendants because those confes-
sions were the product of whipping, hanging, and other physical torture.
32
The Court ruled that:
The due process clause requires "that state action, whether through
one agency or another, shall be consistent with the fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil
28. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434-35 (2000).
29. See, e.g., McNeal, supra note 5, at 954.
30. Detention at Guantanamo Bay-Part 1: H. before the H. Foreign Affairs Subcomm.
on Int7 Orgs., Human Rights, and Oversight, 110th Cong. 1- 12 (2008), [hereinafter Guanta-
namo Bay Hearing], available at www.justice.gov/oig/testimony/t0806.pdf (statement of
Glenn A. Fine, Inspector Gen.).
31. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
32. Id. at 281-82.
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and political institutions." It would be difficult to conceive of me-
thods more revolting to the sense of justice than those taken to
procure the confessions of these petitioners, and the use of the con-
fessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence was
a clear denial of due process.
33
In subsequent cases, the Court looked at other forms of coercion short
of physical torture, such as long hours of uninterrupted isolation and interro-
gation, and ruled that these techniques can also violate due process. 34 The
Court's concern is with both the reliability of the confessions that followed
from coercion, and that confessions obtained via this degree of coercion vi-
olate basic principles of fundamental fairness. 3
5
With these principles as a backdrop, it is difficult to see how a court
could admit the statements obtained by water boarding, extreme sleep depri-
vation, and various other interrogation techniques the government has publi-
cally acknowledged. These techniques seem to be intended to overbear the
will of the detainees and to obtain confessions.36 It can be said of water
boarding, extreme sleep deprivation, slapping, pushing, and other such tech-
niques as was said by the Court in Brown, "the use of the confessions thus
obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence [would be] a clear denial of
due process. 37
This is not, however, the end of the matter. In past years, the Court de-
veloped a number of exceptions to excluding evidence so as to allow the
admissibility of some evidence even when a suspect's constitutional rights
were violated.38 How might these exceptions apply to confessions obtained
in cases involving the extraordinary rendition of terrorist suspects? The three
most likely exceptions the courts may look to apply are: (1) the independent
source, (2) inevitable discovery, and (3) the attenuation exception to the ex-
clusionary rule. 39 Each of these exceptions was created by the Court to avoid
giving the criminal defendant an undeserved windfall from the application of
the exclusionary rule.n° These exceptions were also created to ensure that
law enforcement is not placed in a worse position by the exclusionary rule
33. Id. at 286 (quoting Hebert v. Lousiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
34. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155 (1944).
35. See generally id.
36. See generally Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
37. Brown, 297 U.S. at 286.
38. See generally Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-44 (1988).
39. See id. at 536-39.
40. Id. at 537.
[Vol. 35
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than they would have had they complied with the constitutional require-
ments.4'
The first of these exceptions, the independent source exception, states if
lawful evidence was obtained independent of the illegal police conduct, that
evidence should not be excluded from trial.42 There are two variations to the
independent source exception.43 In the first variation, police misconduct
leads to certain facts X and Y.44 However, if fact Z is discovered by inde-
pendent legal methods, courts will say that fact Z was obtained by an inde-
pendent legal method and not subject to the exclusionary rule.45 In the
second variation, both legal and illegal methods led to the same facts. 46 So
long as the legal methods for discovering the facts are completely separated
from the illegal methods, the evidence was obtained by an independent legal
source and the evidence will not be excluded.47
The Court has applied this exception to searches conducted in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.48 Could it also apply to confessions obtained by
coercion and torture? Publicly available information suggests that after a
number of terrorist suspects were subjected to extraordinary renditions and
coercive interrogations, the government subsequently developed "clean
teams" to interrogate these suspects. 49  These "clean teams" would re-
interrogate the terrorist suspects without using coercion, torture or other
questionable interrogating methods but would instead gain the detainee's
trust and establish rapport as a precursor to obtaining statements. ° It seems
that the government is hoping that some version of the independent source
doctrine might apply to statements obtained by these "clean teams."
It is uncertain whether this approach will work. The critical aspect of
the independent source doctrine is that the evidence was obtained free of any
illegality.5" The government will have a difficult time making this predicate
showing since the questioning by these clean teams followed the coercive
interrogations and it cannot be said that these statements are free of the initial
taint. The Court has addressed this issue in the context of Miranda viola-
41. Id.
42. Id. at 537-38.
43. Murray, 487 U.S. at 537.
44. Id. at 538.
45. Id.
46. See id at 538-39.
47. See id. at 537-39.
48. E.g,. Murray, 487 U.S. at 542-43.
49. Gregory S. McNeal, A Cup of Coffee After the Waterboard: Seemingly Voluntary
Post-Abuse Statements, 59 DEPAUL L. REv. 943, 954 (2010).
50. See id. at 954-55.
51. See Murray, 487 U.S. at 537-38.
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tions and held that when the initial violation involved a Miranda violation
that was not otherwise coercive, the subsequent questioning was free from
the initial Miranda taint.52
The Supreme Court in Oregon v. Elstad was careful to point out that the
only constitutional violation was a failure to read the suspect his Miranda
warnings and that the interrogation was not otherwise coercive.53 In the case
of terrorist suspects rendered to third countries where they were tortured and
coerced, we have much more than a mere Miranda issue. As currently for-
mulated, it is very unlikely that a federal court could apply the independent
source doctrine to statements obtained by these so called "clean teams."
In order for the independent source doctrine to apply to these state-
ments, the doctrine would have to be modified and diluted. Courts might
reason that after a certain amount of time has passed, statements that were
initially obtained by torture and coercion can be discovered independently so
long as that subsequent discovery did not involve coercion. Another possi-
bility is that courts might create some kind of terrorist exception to the nor-
mal application of the independent source doctrine. This exception might
allow for evidence that may still contain the taint of the initial illegality to be
admitted. This might be because the evidence is crucial to the prosecution,
and because the nature of the crimes charged are so serious that we simply
cannot afford to exclude this evidence from the trial.
Modifying and diluting the independent source doctrine in either of
these ways would be problematic because once the doctrine is diluted in this
context, what is to prevent the courts from diluting it in other more ordinary
cases? There is also the larger problem of creating lesser protections for
certain kinds of crimes or criminal suspects before guilt has been established.
Such an approach harkens back to a system that was long ago rejected-and
rightly so-by our legal system.
Inevitable discovery is another exception to the exclusionary rule.54
Under this exception, courts may admit evidence that was illegally obtained
if the government can show it would have inevitably found the evidence by
legal means.55 This exception differs from the independent source exception
because under the inevitable discovery exception, the government will not be
able to show that it actually obtained the evidence by legal means.56 Instead,
52. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985).
53. Id. at 318.
54. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).
55. Id.
56. See id.
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the government must demonstrate that hypothetically, if given enough time,
it would have inevitably discovered the evidence legally.57
As with the independent source exception, the government will be hard-
pressed to show that the evidence obtained by coercive interrogations would
have eventually been discovered by legal means, at least as the inevitable
discovery exception is currently formulated. This is primarily because the
very justification most often used for employing coercive interrogation tech-
niques was the difficulty of obtaining necessary information any other way.
Other than getting the suspected 9/11 terrorists themselves to divulge infor-
mation about past and future plots, it is unlikely the government could dem-
onstrate the evidence contained in the 9/11 terrorist confessions was about to
be discovered by lawful means. This is so, based on our intelligence failures
leading up to the 9/11 attacks, and the fact that terrorist cells tend to be com-
partmentalized and isolated.
If the inevitable discovery exception were to work, courts would be
forced to modify and most probably dilute the exception. Modifications
might come by expanding the time between the illegal discovery and the
inevitable discovery. Or courts possibly might find that once the information
from a coercive confession is verified, it is possible the government could
have put the pieces together without the tainted evidence. Either of these or
some other modifications to the exception would be problematic and once
used in this context, there is always the possibility that they would be ex-
panded to other types of cases.
The third, and quite possibly the most likely exception to the exclusio-
nary rule is the attenuation exception being applied not to the statements
obtained by torture and coercion, but to other evidence derived from those
interrogations. 8 This differs from the independent source exception because
with attenuation there is no legal source for the evidence. 9 It differs from
inevitable discovery in that the government is not required to show a poten-
tial legal source for the evidence existed.60 The rationale for the attenuation
doctrine is that at some point, the consequences of the government's illegal
conduct are so removed from the evidence that the effect of deterrence is
outweighed by the interests in admitting relevant evidence.6'
57. See id.
58. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602 (1975).
59. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) (quoting Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)).
60. Id. at 487.
61. See Brown, 422 U.S. at 612 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,447 (1974)).
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In Brown v. Illinois,62 the Court noted three factors to help determine if
there is sufficient attenuation between the constitutional violation and the
evidence which the government seeks to admit. 63 The first factor is the tem-
poral proximity between the illegal conduct and the evidence that is being
offered.64 The second factor considers what intervening circumstances, if
any, occurred which might sever the connection between the government's
illegality and the evidence.65 The third factor is the flagrancy of the govern-
ment's conduct.66
Applying these factors to the confessions obtained by torture and coer-
cion during extraordinary rendition, one can hardly say the confessions were
attenuated from the illegality since the confessions were the very product of
the illegality. But one should ask about the information that was subsequent-
ly developed from these interrogations. Is it possible that some of this deriv-
ative information is so attenuated from the coercion that the loss of this evi-
dence at trial is too high of a cost to pay? It is hard to formulate specific
factual situations where the attenuation exception might apply, but it is poss-
ible to see how such a potential might exist which would allow the govern-
ment to offer evidence derived from the confession even if it is not allowed
to offer the confession itself. Depending on the quality and quantity of this
evidence, the government might determine that it has sufficient evidence to
convict these terrorist suspects in federal court. While the government has
not made the evidence publically available it would use if Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed and the other 9/11 conspirators were tried in federal court, it is
very likely to rely in part on the attenuation doctrine to get this evidence be-
fore a federal jury.
Courts applying the attenuation exception have recognized that the ap-
plication of this doctrine is contextual, requiring a very specific factual ap-
plication.67 As a result, there may be less likelihood that if the attenuation
exception were applied to the evidence derived from these confessions, it
would have a bleed over diluting effect on other cases outside of the terror-
ism realm. Nevertheless, that concern still exists, particularly in light of the
government's initial decision to ignore basic constitutional protections was
62. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
63. Id. at 603-04.
64. Id. at 603.
65. Id. at 603-04.
66. Id. at 604.
67. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 353 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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hardly inadvertent.68 If derivative evidence from these blatant violations can
be attenuated, when would the attenuation exception not apply?
m. TRIAL IN MILITARY COURTS-MARTIAL
Prosecuting suspected terrorists who have been subjected to extraordi-
nary renditions, torture, and coercion in federal court presents enormous evi-
dentiary challenges if the government hopes to admit either the evidence of
their confessions or evidence derived from those confessions. These chal-
lenges may not be insurmountable, but there is a very legitimate concern that
courts would have to so dilute some fundamental constitutional protections
in order for the evidence to be admitted that basic protections enjoyed by all
citizens would be placed at risk. For some, this is the strongest argument
against trying these suspects in federal court and instead using some alternate
process so that our fundamental protections would remain intact. How might
this type of evidence fair in an alternative system, and would fundamental
protections outside of the terrorism context remain viable?
Other than federal court, the next most obvious and readily available
system would be trial of these terrorist suspects in a military court-martial.
Military courts have jurisdiction to try these suspects.69 Article 18 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice Congress specifically grants jurisdiction to
military courts to try violations of the law of war.7 ° While there is debate
over exactly which offenses fall under the law of war, there is little doubt
that murder of innocent, civilian non-combatants is a war crime. As prin-
ciples and accessories to murder, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and others who
had been held at CIA sites in foreign countries could come under court-
martial jurisdiction. How would the admissibility of coerced confessions be
treated in this forum?
The protections against self incrimination and the prohibition of coerced
confessions in the military follow virtually the same constitutional frame-
work as in federal court. There are no special exceptions or allowances for
coerced confessions in the military system. 71 The due process protections are
equally applicable.7 2 This means that the litigation and resolution of confes-
68. David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights as
Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 367 (2003).
69. UNIF. CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 18; 10 U.S.C.A § 818 (West 2009).
70. See UNIF. CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 18.
71. See Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953).
72. See United States v. Griffin, 50 M.J. 278, 283 (1999); United States v. Ford, 51 M.J.
445, 450 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
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sions obtained by torture and coercion are likely to be the same in the court-
martial system as they are in federal court.
Likewise, the application of the exclusionary rule works much the same
in military courts-martial as in federal court. Statements that are obtained by
coercion are not admissible.7 3 Like their federal counterparts, military courts
also reason that even if a subsequent statement was free of coercion, if the
initial statement was the product of coercion, the independent source and
inevitable discovery exceptions to the exclusionary rule are not likely to ap-
ply. 74
In addition to these protections, military law imposes greater require-
ments for rights warnings than the requirements imposed by the Court in
Miranda and subsequent cases. Article 3 1(b) of the UCMJ requires that any
person suspected of committing an offense be warned of his right against self
incrimination.75 This protection is broader than Miranda warnings in two
ways. First, the warnings are not contingent on the suspect being placed in
custody. Second, the warnings are a statutory requirement, not a court
created protection. The warnings are required by statute, and therefore,
courts have much less flexibility to create exceptions to the rule's require-
ments than the Supreme Court has done in limiting Miranda.
IV. TRIAL BY MILITARY COMMISSION
What this means is that those who are concerned that federal courts may
prove to be too difficult of a forum in which to try terrorist suspects are not
likely to see military courts-martial as a better option, or as good of an op-
tion. In order for these confessions and other derivative evidence to be ad-
mitted, military courts would have to dilute constitutional protections in
much the same way as federal courts.
Creating a completely separate system to try only these terrorist sus-
pects seems, for many, to be the better approach. Because the system would
be cabined off from the rest of the criminal justice system, decisions by these
courts as to the admissibility of confessions would have no precedential val-
ue in the regular court system, so the argument goes.
The Bush administration was never completely clear as to why it initial-
ly opted for military commissions.76 John Altenburg, who was selected by
73. United States v. Freeman, 65 M.J. 451, 453 (C.A.A.F. 2008).
74. See United States v. Gardinier, 65 M.J. 60, 63 (C.A.A.F. 2007), rev'd by 67 M.J. 304
(C.A.F.F. 2009).
75. UNIF. CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 31(b); see also 10 U.S.C. § 831 (2006).
76. See generally News Release, Defense Department Briefing on Military Commissions
Hearings, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE (Aug. 17 2004, 1:35 PM), http://www.defense.gov/
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the then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to serve as the Appointing Authority
for the military commissions, articulated the rationale for the military com-
missions as follows:
[T]he government chose for many different reasons to use a mili-
tary commission process. It doesn't mean that the others were
wrong. It just means that the government chose on balance, given
the nature of the allegations that were being made and I think es-
pecially national security interests, that they chose to use the
commission process, thinking that, that would meet the balanced
needs.77
This is hardly a clear and specific explanation of the rationale for military
commissions.
The government's brief in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld78 likely offers the most
specific justification for the military commissions. According to the gov-
ernment, military commissions have a long history under United States and
international law.79 Under United States law, military commissions are the
military's 'common-law war courts."'8 These commissions are not bound
by an established set of rules or procedure. Rather, the commissions and
their procedures are created and 'adapted in each instance' to meet the
needs of that specific occasion.81 Certainly, one of the needs in this specific
occasion is the challenge of getting confessions and derivative evidence be-
fore a fact finder that was the product of torture and coercion.
Looking to the evolution of the military commissions process from its
initial inception in 2002 to its current form in 2009, how the commissions
treat coerced confessions has been a particular point of focus. The initial
rule regarding the admissibility of evidence stated broadly:
Evidence shall be admitted if, in the opinion of the Presiding Of-
ficer (or instead, if any other member of the Commission so re-
quests at the time the Presiding Officer renders that opinion, the
transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2648 [hereinafter Briefing on Military Commission
Hearings].
77. Id.
78. 548 U.S. 557 (2006), superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub.
L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
79. Brief for Respondent at 1, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184),;
Press Release, Kathleen T. Rhem, Am. Forces Press Servs., Dep't of Defense, Long History
Behind Military Commissions (Aug. 19, 2004), http://www.defense.gove/news/
newsarticle.apx?id=25489 [hereinafter Long History behind Military Commissions].
80. Brief for Respondent, supra note 78, at 44.
81. Id. at 45 (quoting Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 347-48 (1952)).
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opinion of the Commission rendered at that time by a majority of
the Commission), the evidence would have probative value to a
reasonable person. 82
Under this broad rule coerced confessions, like any other evidence
could be admitted and considered if a majority of the commission believed
the confessions had probative value. This would be true for derivative evi-
dence as well.
Since this first attempt at military commissions, there have been at least
four major modifications.83 The latest version is reflected in the Military
Commissions Act as amended in 2009.84 This version of the commissions
system is unquestionably a much more sophisticated and robust criminal
justice system then what was first proposed in 2002.85 In spite of the clear
advancements in the process, even this latest version of military commissions
carves out special rules designed to allow for greater admissibility of coerced
confessions than would be permissible either in federal court or in a military
court-martial. 86 These rules are reflected most clearly in both the act itself
and the Manual for Military Commissions, which sets out the specific proce-
dural rules that govern the commissions.
87
Commissions Rule of Evidence 304 titled "Confessions, admissions,
and other statements" set out the current rules as follows:
(a) "General Rules...
(1) Exclusion of Statements Obtained by Torture or Cruel, Inhu-
mane, or Degrading Treatment. No statement, obtained by the use
of torture or by cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment (as de-
fined by section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (42
U.S.C. 2000dd)), whether or not under color of law, shall be ad-
missible in a [trial by] military commission . . . except against a
person accused of torture or such treatment as evidence that the
statement was made.
82. 32 C.F.R. § 9.6(d)(1) (2003).
83. See generally Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2574
(2009) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 948a-950t (West 2009)).
84. See id.
85. Compare id., with S. 1937, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002).
86. See generally Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat.
2574.
87. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMM'NS (2010) [hereinafter
MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMM'NS].
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(2) Other Statements of the Accused. A statement of the accused
may be admitted in evidence in a military commission only if the
military judge finds-
(A) that the totality of the circumstances renders the statement re-
liable and possessing sufficient probative value; and
(3) that-
(i) the statement was made incident to lawful conduct during mili-
tary operations at the point of capture or during closely related ac-
tive combat engagement, and the interests of justice would best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence; or
(ii) the statement was voluntarily given."
(3) Statements from persons other than the accused allegedly pro-
duced by coercion. When the degree of coercion inherent in the
production of a statement from a person other than the accused, of-
fered by either party, is disputed, such statement may only be ad-
mitted if the military judge finds that-
(A) the totality of the circumstances renders the statement reliable
and possessing sufficient probative value;
(B) the interests of justice would best be served by admission of
the statement into evidence; and
(C) the statement was not obtained through the use of torture or
cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment as defined in section
1003(d) of the Detainee Treatment Act, Pub. L. 109-148 (2005)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000dd(d)).
(4) "Determination of Voluntariness. In determining for purposes
of [(a)(2)(B)(ii)], whether a statement was voluntarily given, the
military judge shall consider the totality of the circumstances, in-
cluding, as appropriate, the following:
(A) The details of the taking of the statement, accounting for the
circumstances of the conduct of military and intelligence opera-
tions during hostilities[;]
(B) [tihe characteristics of the accused, such as military training,
age, and education level[; and]
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(C) the lapse of time, change of place, or change in identity of the
questioners between the statement sought to be admitted and any
prior questioning of the accused."
(5) Derivative Evidence.
(A) Evidence Derived from Statements Obtained by Torture or
Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrading Treatment. Evidence derived
from a statement that would be excluded under section (a)(I) of
this rule "may not be received in evidence against an accused who
made the statement if the accused makes a timely motion to sup-
press or an objection," unless the military judge determines by a
preponderance of the evidence that-
(i) "the evidence would have been obtained even if the statement
had not been made N;" or
(ii) use of such evidence would otherwise be consistent with the
interests of justice.
(B) Evidence Derived from Other Excludable Statements of the
Accused. Evidence derived from a statement that would be ex-
cluded under section (a)(2) of this rule may not be received in evi-
dence against an accused who made the statement if the accused
makes a timely motion to suppress or an objection, unless the mili-
tary judge determines by a preponderance of the evidence that-
(i) "the totality of the circumstances renders the evidence reliable
and possessing sufficient probative value; and"
(ii) use of such evidence would be consistent with the interests of
justice.88
A close examination of these rules shows that they are designed to al-
low for admission of the very kind of confession evidence, which is likely to
be excluded in federal court and military courts-martial. First, the section
provides for a uniform definition of torture, cruel, inhumane, and degrading
treatment. Second, it establishes a per se exclusion of confessions obtained
by these methods. Of course the devil is in the details, and there continues to
88. The statutory analysis is compiled from MIL. COMM. R. EvID. 304, MIL. R. EVID. 304,
and 10 U.S.C. § 948r (2006), with quoted material primarily from the United States Code,
Title 10, section 948r and rule 304 MIL. COMM. R. EvID.
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be debate over whether specific techniques, such as water boarding and other
coercion, fall within this definition.
Coercion that does not rise to the level of torture or cruel, inhumane, or
degrading may still be coercive, but the rules do not establish a per se exclu-
sion. If statements taken from an accused were obtained by some lower level
of coercion, those statements may be admitted against the accused if the mili-
tary judge determines the evidence is reliable, probative, and was either ob-
tained in circumstances closely related to combat operations, or was volunta-
ry.89 Under this rule, it seems unlikely that statements obtained while sus-
pects were rendered to CIA "black sites" in third country sites would be
closely related to combat operations. 90
The real issue is whether such statements are voluntary. In considering
whether the statement was voluntary, Rule 304(c) sets out three factors: (1)
the context under which the statement was taken; (2) the personal characte-
ristics of the accused/declarant; and (3) the attenuation between the alleged
coercion and the statement. 9' The attenuation factor seems to have been
created for the express purpose of allowing statements to be admitted and
considered even if coercion was involved. As noted above, federal courts
and military courts-martial have typically taken a much more restrictive view
of attenuation. 92 It is certainly possible and foreseeable that a commissions
judge would determine that a statement given under these circumstances
might be voluntary in a military commission, even if it would not be volunta-
ry or admissible in federal court or a court-martial.
If the statements were made by someone other than the accused and al-
legations are made that the statements were coerced, those statements can be
admitted if: (1) they are reliable and probative; (2) they were not obtained
by coercion that rises to the level of torture, cruel, inhumane, or degrading
treatment; and (3) the admission would satisfy the vague standard of being in
the interests of justice.93 This rule potentially allows for greater admissibility
of statements than would be permissible in the other two forums.
Finally, the rule defines the standards for admitting evidence that was
derived from confessions obtained by torture, cruel, inhumane, or degrading
treatment.94 If derivative evidence is being offered against the accused, the
89. See 10 U.S.C. § 948r(c).
90. The government of course might argue that given the nature of the unique threat
posed by terrorism, the battlefield and combat operations are not limited by space and time
and thus exists at all times and in all places.
91. See IOU.S.C.§948r(d)(l)-(3).
92. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,603-04(1975).
93. See MIL. COMM. R. EvID. 304(b).
94. See id.; see also 10 U.S.C. § 948(r)(a) 2009.
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government must show an independent source for the evidence, prove inevit-
able discovery, or prove that admission of the derivative evidence would be
in the interests of justice.95 It is this "interests of justice" prong that is a sig-
nificant departure from established practice in federal court and military
courts-martial. As detailed above, the independent source and inevitable
discovery doctrines are well recognized.96 Even though these exceptions
may be difficult to establish in situations where the evidence was derived
from coercive interrogations, that possibility exists. But this second, much
broader "interests of justice" basis is not recognized as an independent ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule. Since this standard is so vague and mallea-
ble, it might be much easier for a judge to admit evidence under this standard
that was derived from torture-particularly given the emotionally and politi-
cally charged nature of the offenses with which the terrorism suspect is ac-
cused.
If the derivative evidence came from coercive statements but did not
rise to the level of torture, or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment, the
admissibility of this derivative evidence is even easier. The evidence need
only be relevant and probative, and admission must satisfy the interests of
justice.97 Looking at these rules in light of the challenges for admitting
coerced statements and derivative evidence in federal court and military
courts-martial, the rules seem to be specifically crafted to get around many of
those difficulties.
V. THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM WITH MILITARY COMMISSIONS
One might ask, is this a better approach? It could be argued that creat-
ing this separate system to deal with problematic evidence is a better ap-
proach because it allows for some form of justice, while not as protective as
what would be found in federal court or military courts-martial, but protec-
tive enough. One could also argue it has the added advantage of creating a
completely separate system, so that there is little risk that any dilution of
protections would bleed over into those other forums.
But these arguments warrant close scrutiny. It is important to remember
the problem of admitting confessions and other evidence obtained by torture
and other coercive methods is a problem of our own making. Neither the
suspected terrorists nor the crime of terrorism created the dilemma that we
now face. Our response to the attacks of September 11 th, combined with our
95. See MIL. COMM. R. EVID. 304(b)(3); MIL. COMM. R. EVID. 304(c).
96. See generally Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988).
97. 10 U.S.C. §948(r)(c).
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fear that more attacks might follow, led the government to employ extraordi-
nary renditions and harsh interrogation methods. It is critical to keep this
point in mind as we consider whether creating a separate system allowing for
greater admissibility of this evidence is really the best way to maintain fun-
damental protections against coercive questioning in the regular criminal
justice system.
A system created for the purpose of allowing the government to avoid
the consequences that come from obtaining information in violation of basic
due process protections is morally suspect. This is even more so for the very
reason that the problem was one of the government's own making. The gov-
ernment had a choice not to go down this road and instead to follow a well-
established precedent for the treatment of detainees. In choosing to disregard
that option, the government was certainly aware of the risks. Can a system
of justice be legitimate when, at its core, it is designed to allow the govern-
ment to avoid these consequences?
I would argue that a justice system created under this premise is a sys-
tem that has the greatest potential to dilute fundamental protections not only
for suspected terrorists, but for ordinary citizens who will never face the pos-
sibility of being tried in a military commission. This is so for several rea-
sons.
Concepts of terrorism, terrorist acts, terrorist organizations, unlawful
enemy combatants, unprivileged belligerents, and a host of other terms used
to identify the category of crimes and suspects selected for trial by military
commission, are not clear or precise. If today members of Al Qaeda fit this
category because of the threat they pose to our security, what is to prevent
members of a drug cartel operating on the border of the United States from
being defined as terrorists at some future date and subjected to trial by mili-
tary commission as part of a "war on drugs?" The precedent set by these
military commissions could certainly allow for that.
Second, there is the risk of establishing a precedent that, whenever the
government finds the current protections too restrictive, it will simply create
an alternative means of trying defendants. In reality, this is the unfortunate
legacy of many past military commissions. While military commissions
have a long history in our legal system, it is not necessarily a proud history.
Creating a special set of rules for the current situation creates a new incentive
for the government to both disregard important protections and then avoid
the consequences of those violations.
The government undoubtedly looked to this dubious legacy when it
created the initial commission's procedures. Even though the current round
of military commission's rules are a vast improvement from the first proce-
dures created in early 2002, many of the changes have come only after in-
volvement by the courts and later, by Congress. Even after involvement by
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the courts and Congress, in the end many of the commission procedures were
created for the very purpose of denying-or at least avoiding-fundamental
protections. It is difficult to imagine how a system with such a bad pedigree
could not have a corrosive impact on the protections against coerced testi-
mony. The corrosive impact of creating a completely separate system that
avoids basic protections is not easy to measure, but it is likely not any less
corrosive than some possible dilution of protections that might occur if these
cases are tried in federal court or in a court-martial.
In addition to these problems, trying terrorist suspects in military com-
missions puts this entire legal system in untested waters. Under this system,
there is no controlling precedent to turn to. Commission judges are required
in the first instance to determine if evidence derived from torture should be
admitted in the "interests of justice." There is no telling what this even
means, or how a judge could ever find that such evidence satisfies the inter-
ests of justice. Because there is no precedent for these decisions, judges will
be on their own, and given the broad standard that they are applying, it is
doubtful that these decisions will have consistency or transparency.
Contrast that process with how judges in federal court or a court-martial
would decide the admissibility of confessions. These judges have an estab-
lished body of case law before them on which to base their decisions. Be-
cause of that established precedent, these judges will also be less likely to
take extreme positions, and because their decisions are subject to review
under a well established process, those decisions have the important added
value of transparency. All of these protections will help to ensure that basic
due process protections will not be stretched to the breaking point, either for
those suspected terrorists or for citizens accused of other crimes. No similar
limitations or protections exist if these cases are tried by military commis-
sion.
VI. CONCLUSION
The government under the Bush administration started down a very
troubling path when it opted to engage in extraordinary renditions, torture,
and cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment in hopes of getting confessions
from suspected terrorists. Beyond the important moral and legal issues
raised by engaging in this conduct, there are the second and third order ef-
fects that we are now left to deal with. Whether these effects were fully con-
templated or anticipated at the time is unknown, but now, as we debate
which forum is best suited for trying terrorism suspects, the problems and
challenges have come into focus. If it was not clear before, it certainly is
now that introducing evidence obtained by these means can have a corrosive
effect on our broader legal system.
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When we ask what forum for these trials would have the least corrosive
impact on our system of justice, we see the unfortunate, if not unsurprising,
answer is that introducing evidence that is a product of coercion in any forum
is likely to dilute fundamental protections that all citizens enjoy. One con-
clusion might be that the problems of admitting confessions and derivative
evidence that are the products of torture and coercion are intractable and
there is no forum suitable for these cases. That seems to me to be an extreme
and unrealistic position. That fact is that, for several reasons, the govern-
ment and the public in general expect these suspects to be brought to justice.
If we are going to try them, then we must ask which forum really is best
suited to ensure that they can be brought to justice without jeopardizing fun-
damental protections against coerced confessions.
At first blush, trying terrorist suspects who have been subjected to tor-
ture and other coercive questioning in a separate military commissions sys-
tem seems like a good answer. It compartmentalizes these cases and argua-
bly protects against compromises which are made in this system from bleed-
ing over to more mainstream cases. Closer examination of this issue leads to
a different conclusion. First, the category of who can be tried by military
commission is hardly airtight. Today's criminals can easily become tomor-
row's terrorists if the government sees the threat as serious enough to broa-
den the category.
A system so subject to manipulation is not protective of fundamental
due process rights. There is also the problem that those making the decisions
on questions of admissibility in the military commissions system are without
the guidance of precedent. They are left to their own determinations to apply
concepts so broad as to lack any real meaning. This does not bode well for
the kind of careful and reasoned opinions we have come to expect from
judges in our criminal justice system.
More corrosive than this is the illegitimacy of a system that was created
for the purpose of watering down fundamental protections. The decision to
torture and coerce confessions in order to obtain evidence was wrong. These
are interrogation methods that have long been rejected, and rightly so, in our
system of justice. The errors in resorting to these discarded methods should
not be compounded by creating a system that specifically seeks an end-run
around basic protections in order for this evidence to be admitted. A system
such as this lacks fundamental legitimacy. It is a system that puts the rights
of everyone at risk.
Those who argue that we need to move these cases to military commis-
sions in order to protect the rights of ordinary citizens ignore these even
greater risks of corrosion and dilution. In other words, moving these cases to
military commissions as presently constituted would cause the very result
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that the proponents of that choice claim they want to prevent. On this basis,
military commissions are not the better option.
Introducing or attempting to introduce coerced confessions or derivative
evidence in federal court is problematic. As noted above, even if the court
applied exceptions to the exclusionary as currently formulated, it will be
difficult for much of this evidence to be admitted. Some accommodations
will likely have to be made if this evidence is to be considered. While creat-
ing such accommodations is not ideal, it is certainly less extreme than com-
pletely revamping a justice system for the express purpose of eliminating
fundamental protections altogether.
Even if accommodations are made to admit this evidence in federal
court, there are added protections within the system that will limit the corro-
sive effects of these accommodations. Federal court proceedings are more
transparent than the proceedings we have thus far seen from military com-
missions. By transparency, I am referring to both the courtroom procedures
and the development of the evidentiary and other rules governing those pro-
cedures. I also include the rulings and opinions of federal court judges. Be-
cause of the transparency of both the process and the decisions, federal
judges are bound to more clearly identify and explain when and why they
might be modifying established protections found in the exclusionary rule in
order to admit certain evidence. Moreover, consistency and following estab-
lished precedent are critical aspects of judicial decision-making. Transpa-
rency and consistency thus serve as important checks that are likely to limit
any diluting and corrosive impacts that might otherwise occur from trying
these terrorist suspects in federal court.
In addition to these protections, there are multiple levels of review of
any trial court's decisions and rulings. This review process also helps to
ensure consistency, as well as prevent trial courts from ignoring or diluting
the law in order to reach a desired outcome.
These protections have a double benefit. First, in the trial of the actual
terrorist suspects, these protections will limit the possible corrosive impacts
from occurring. Second, in other, more ordinary trials not involving terrorist
suspects, these checks will limit any accommodations made under the unique
facts of a terrorist case from encroaching into these more ordinary cases.
These various structural protections, anchored in the values of consis-
tency and transparency, would not be nearly as robust in a military commis-
sions system created for the express purpose of watering down fundamental
rights. Put simply, trial in federal court is preferable because the dilution of
rights is less likely in that system than it would be in a military commissions
system.
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